Analysis of attacks on robotic operation system
The latest version of ROS was released on May 23 this year, and according to the developers, there will be no more new versions. The future belongs to ROS2.mA robots or robotic system is often a modular system where each module communicates with other modules. In ROS terminology, such modules are ca...
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| Hoofdauteurs: | , |
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| Formaat: | Статья |
| Taal: | English |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
CEUR-WS
2022
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| Onderwerpen: | |
| Online toegang: | https://dspace.ncfu.ru/handle/20.500.12258/19382 |
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| Samenvatting: | The latest version of ROS was released on May 23 this year, and according to the developers, there will be no more new versions. The future belongs to ROS2.mA robots or robotic system is often a modular system where each module communicates with other modules. In ROS terminology, such modules are called nodes, and they can communicate in a subscriber-publisher or client-server fashion. There is also a special Master node, which is responsible for the initial linking of ordinary nodes. ROS was not designed with security considerations in mind, i.e. ensuring the «three pillars» - confidentiality, integrity or authenticity. Consequently, ROS becomes a tidbit for attackers. They can listen to traffic; Disable individual nodes; Replace nodes. The situation was further simplified when utilities for auditing the security of ROS systems appeared in the public domain: Roschaos, Rospento. In addition, the developers of ROS applications independently implemented protection measures to prevent these threats. |
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