TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR THE ECONOMIC AGENTS

The strategy analysis of taxpayer behavior while observing tax law requires weakening of traditional initial assumptions in order to take into account the subjective character of economic agents' reaction to tax system changes. The aim of the given research is to identify the appropriate model...

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Hauptverfasser:	Molodykh, V. A., Молодых, В. А., Rubezhnoy, A. A., Рубежной, А. А.
Format:	Статья
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	URAL FEDERAL UNIV 2018
Schlagworte:	Behavioral economy tax compliance Tax evasion Tax policy
Online Zugang:	http://apps.webofknowledge.com/full_record.do?product=WOS&search_mode=GeneralSearch&qid=5&SID=D6KbA3S5nnd85UbfcHN&page=1&doc=1 https://dspace.ncfu.ru/handle/20.500.12258/3114
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spelling	ir-20.500.12258-31142020-07-06T13:33:55Z TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR THE ECONOMIC AGENTS Molodykh, V. A. Молодых, В. А. Rubezhnoy, A. A. Рубежной, А. А. Behavioral economy tax compliance Tax evasion Tax policy The strategy analysis of taxpayer behavior while observing tax law requires weakening of traditional initial assumptions in order to take into account the subjective character of economic agents' reaction to tax system changes. The aim of the given research is to identify the appropriate model of taxpayers' behavior in conditions of the tax control procedures transformation. The research methodology is based on the synthesis of the neo-classical concept of individual's rational choice, and on the assumptions of behavioral economics, which allowed considering the problem of tax evasion as the situation of social interaction among economic agents in decentralized system by taking into account their individual interests. The results of modeling demonstrated that tightening tax surveillance procedures undermines the coordination of interaction among autonomous tax groups. It leads to the growth of the possibility to select deviant behavior models. In this case the growth of tax management system efficiency expresses in budget income maximization, and is possible only by means of the extensive development of tax control procedures. The optimal strategy of the government behavior is using multimodal approach based on the partial replacement of control function for the cooperative strategy of tax subjects' interaction to reduce the natural taxpayer opportunism rate. And as an exceptional measure the harsh sanctions aimed to resist the deviant models of behavior are used. In this case the optimal choice for a taxpayer will depend additionally on the changes of social norms and stereotypes of behavior that characterize the quality of the institutional environment changes 2018-10-02T09:19:57Z 2018-10-02T09:19:57Z 2017 Статья Molodykh, VA; Rubezhnoy, AA. TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR THE ECONOMIC AGENTS // JOURNAL OF TAX REFORM. - 2017. - Том: 3. - Выпуск: 3. - Стр.: 216-225 http://apps.webofknowledge.com/full_record.do?product=WOS&search_mode=GeneralSearch&qid=5&SID=D6KbA3S5nnd85UbfcHN&page=1&doc=1 http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12258/3114 en JOURNAL OF TAX REFORM application/pdf URAL FEDERAL UNIV
institution	СКФУ
collection	Репозиторий
language	English
topic	Behavioral economy tax compliance Tax evasion Tax policy
spellingShingle	Behavioral economy tax compliance Tax evasion Tax policy Molodykh, V. A. Молодых, В. А. Rubezhnoy, A. A. Рубежной, А. А. TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR THE ECONOMIC AGENTS
description	The strategy analysis of taxpayer behavior while observing tax law requires weakening of traditional initial assumptions in order to take into account the subjective character of economic agents' reaction to tax system changes. The aim of the given research is to identify the appropriate model of taxpayers' behavior in conditions of the tax control procedures transformation. The research methodology is based on the synthesis of the neo-classical concept of individual's rational choice, and on the assumptions of behavioral economics, which allowed considering the problem of tax evasion as the situation of social interaction among economic agents in decentralized system by taking into account their individual interests. The results of modeling demonstrated that tightening tax surveillance procedures undermines the coordination of interaction among autonomous tax groups. It leads to the growth of the possibility to select deviant behavior models. In this case the growth of tax management system efficiency expresses in budget income maximization, and is possible only by means of the extensive development of tax control procedures. The optimal strategy of the government behavior is using multimodal approach based on the partial replacement of control function for the cooperative strategy of tax subjects' interaction to reduce the natural taxpayer opportunism rate. And as an exceptional measure the harsh sanctions aimed to resist the deviant models of behavior are used. In this case the optimal choice for a taxpayer will depend additionally on the changes of social norms and stereotypes of behavior that characterize the quality of the institutional environment changes
format	Статья
author	Molodykh, V. A. Молодых, В. А. Rubezhnoy, A. A. Рубежной, А. А.
author_facet	Molodykh, V. A. Молодых, В. А. Rubezhnoy, A. A. Рубежной, А. А.
author_sort	Molodykh, V. A.
title	TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR THE ECONOMIC AGENTS
title_short	TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR THE ECONOMIC AGENTS
title_full	TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR THE ECONOMIC AGENTS
title_fullStr	TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR THE ECONOMIC AGENTS
title_full_unstemmed	TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR THE ECONOMIC AGENTS
title_sort	tax compliance and the choice of an optimum strategy for the economic agents
publisher	URAL FEDERAL UNIV
publishDate	2018
url	http://apps.webofknowledge.com/full_record.do?product=WOS&search_mode=GeneralSearch&qid=5&SID=D6KbA3S5nnd85UbfcHN&page=1&doc=1 https://dspace.ncfu.ru/handle/20.500.12258/3114
work_keys_str_mv	AT molodykhva taxcomplianceandthechoiceofanoptimumstrategyfortheeconomicagents AT molodyhva taxcomplianceandthechoiceofanoptimumstrategyfortheeconomicagents AT rubezhnoyaa taxcomplianceandthechoiceofanoptimumstrategyfortheeconomicagents AT rubežnojaa taxcomplianceandthechoiceofanoptimumstrategyfortheeconomicagents
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TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR THE ECONOMIC AGENTS

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